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1 Introduction
Although there is a vast literature on monopolistic power in product and
factor markets, and also credit market imperfections, practically there is no
research that considers the possibility of monopoly power in ﬁnancial mar-
kets in a business cycle context.1 This possibility is particularly relevant in
developing economies, for three reasons. Firstly, banking remains a primary
source of funds for entrepreneurs in those countries.2 Secondly, consolidation
of the banking sector has been spurred by the liberalization of ﬁnancial mar-
kets worldwide in the last decades. Making use of large economies of scale,
international banks have taken over established banks in relatively small ﬁ-
nancial markets. Finally, empirical evidence in real goods markets shows that
markups are countercyclical. 3 If bank markups are also countercyclical, this
gives rise to a bank-supply channel that extends the credit channel to rein-
force the same vicious circle: Credit is more expensive during recessions, so
that ﬁrms and households postpone investment, work, and consumption de-
cisions and thereby deepen the recession. But while the standard version of
the credit channel relies on the external ﬁnance problem that induces banks
to charge a premium to cover the increase in expected bankruptcy costs
during recessions, the bank-supply channel is solely the result of imperfect
competition in the banking system.
I set up a New Keynesian small open economy model with imperfect
competition in the banking system and countercyclical bank markups that
ampliﬁes and propagates both real and nominal external shocks. Following
1Olivero (2004) considers the presence of a “global” oligopolistic banking sector, and
assumes an ad-hoc procyclical price elasticity of the demand for credit to solve the
“consumption-output” and “quantity” anomaly.
2See, for instance, empirical evidence in Rojas-Suares and Weisbrod (1994) and Catena
(1996).
3For instance, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Chevallier and Sharfstein
(1996) among others. Pigou (1927) and Keynes (1939) were the ﬁrst ones to suggest
that markups were countercyclical in real goods markets.
1empirical evidence in Mandelman (2005), limit pricing strategies are the ori-
gin of these countercyclical bank markups. Limit pricing is the practice of
setting prices at the limit level that deters entry. As shown in Bain (1956),
the price level in an industry strongly inﬂuences ﬁrms contemplating entry.
Thus, temporary low interest rates may not be the result of changes in the
banking structure but just the optimal entry-deterrence strategy for the in-
cumbents. In this scenario, the threat of entry is the only reason to avoid
proﬁt maximization.
It is well-documented that bank penetration commonly takes place in the
wholesale banking market initially and then expands to the retail market.4
The penetration into the retail sector is obstructed, however, by the require-
ment of incurring large sunk entry costs (for instance, large advertising ex-
penditures or the construction of a network of branches and ATMs required
to accommodate small transactions). This implies that banks need to enter
at a minimum-eﬃcient-scale (MES) to justify the sunk costs incurred. Also,
they must capture a large enough fraction of the market right after enter-
ing to make the constructed network proﬁtable. This is particularly diﬃcult
in the banking industry, in which the markets are segmented into regional
or sectorial niches.5 In this scenario, the size of the market constitutes a
barrier to entry. If the ﬁnancial market is small or underdeveloped there is
space for only a few incumbents operating at an eﬃcient scale. Thus, boom
periods lead to an expansion of the ﬁnancial system that attracts potential
competitors who see the possibility of operating at an eﬃcient scale. In this
situation, contestable markets force incumbents to charge markups well be-
low short-run proﬁt maximizing levels so as to avoid entry. In contrast, the
competitive pressure decreases during recessions and the banks in the local
ﬁnancial system are able to exert their monopolistic power by charging high
markups.
To judge the empirical relevance of the setup, I conduct a quantitative
exercise aimed at replicating the volatility in real variables for a set of emerg-
ing economies in which bank markups are sizable. The model succeeds at
accounting for the high volatility of investment registered in these countries,
even in a context of ﬂexible exchange rates and liabilities denominated in
local currency. Such “safeguards” are able to absorb the impact of external
shocks in models that have only the standard credit channel (i.e. balance-
4See evidence in Claessens et al (2001).
5See evidence in Petersen and Rajan (1994).
2sheet eﬀect), which fails to deliver any ampliﬁcation mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the empirical
evidence and proceed with a literature review. In section 3, I introduce the
model. In section 4, I present the parameterization of the model and the
solution method. I then describe the transmission mechanism and undertake
a welfare analysis. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 Literature Review and Empirical Evidence
There exists a lengthy literature on the eﬀect of balance sheets on borrower
spending that works to propagate external shocks as well as ﬁnancial crises
in emerging economies. Examples include: Aghion et al (2000), Céspedes et
al (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2000), Devereux and Lane (2003),
Faia and Monacelli (2002), Christiano et al (2002). These contributions aim
to capture an old idea of Keynes and Fisher who originally recognized the im-
perfect nature of ﬁnancial markets. This is that, deteriorating credit market
conditions like deﬂation-originated real debt burden increments and collaps-
ing asset prices (that alter collateral valuations and default costs) are not
only simply consequences of a declining economy, but actually a major cause
of the decline. My baseline model is closer to Gertler et al (2003), who extend
the standard New Keynesian small open economy framework to include the
credit channel as originally developed by Bernanke et al (2000). In addition,
the introduction of nominal rigidities allows for exchange rate policy evalua-
tion. Nonetheless, the internal propagation mechanism in these papers relies
on either ﬁxed exchange rate regimes or the presence of ﬁrms’ liabilities de-
n o m i n a t e di nf o r e i g nc u r r e n c y .W i t hﬁxed exchange rates, the rise in either
the country risk premium or foreign interest rates causes an immediate rise
in domestic interest rates. As a consequence, asset (and collateral) values
plummet and external ﬁnance risk premia rise, leading to a fall in invest-
ment that propagates the shock to the economy. A diﬀerent approach to the
role of leverage positions is based on the “fear of ﬂoating” perspective that
argues in favor of ﬁxed exchange rates schemes. Liabilities are assumed to be
mostly dollarized and the exchange rate pass-trough rapid.6 Although ﬂex-
ible exchange rates oﬀset the macroeconomic impact trough an immediate
6See for instance Calvo and Mendoza (2000), and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
3depreciation of the local currency, liabilities denominated in foreign currency
and revenues denominated in domestic currency boost ﬁrms’ leverage ratio
and increase the risk premia.
Regarding the study of the bank-supply channel to be introduced here,
the ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd a proper measure for markups in the banking industry
data. A simple approach is to consider the ex-ante (posted) spread or dif-
ference between lending and deposit rates, as a proxy for ﬁnancial markups.
The diﬃculty here is that the spread also includes a premium to cover the ex-
pected borrowers’ bankruptcy costs, wh i c hi st h ec o r eo ft h es t a n d a r dc r e d i t
channel.
The so-called risk premium has the sole intention of covering these ex-
pected bankruptcy costs. We expect that, in the long run, aggregate bank
income obtained from such risk premia charges actually match banks’ loan
default costs. Therefore, I consider annual banks’ balance sheet ex-post data
that accounts for defaulted loans to proxy for net markups. In particular,
I will use net interest margins (NIM), equal to bank’s total interest income
minus interest expense divided by total assets after subtracting defaulted
loans. As explained in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), bank interest
margins can be seen as an indicator of the pure ineﬃciency of the banking
system.7 Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on ex-post margins for
a selected group of emerging and developed economies. A lower degree of
ﬁnancial development not only results in much greater average interest mar-
gins for the former group (as expected) but also in more volatile margins
both in absolute and relative terms.
Practically all the evidence on cyclicality is focused on ex-ante spreads.8
An exception is Mandelman (2005), in which dynamic panel estimates show
that in emerging countries ex-post margins are strongly countercyclical, even
after controlling for ﬁnancial development, banking concentration, operat-
ing costs, inﬂation, and simultaneity or reverse causation. In emerging
economies, this countercyclical pattern is explained by the entry of foreign
banks that occurs during booms. Entry, which mostly happens at whole-
sale level, signals the intention to enter later into the retail niches and, as
I understand, triggers limit pricing strategies in concentrated ﬁnancial mar-
7For more details, see Mandelman (2005).
8See, for instance, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Edwards and Vegh (1997) and Olivero
(2004). Similarly, Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) use GDP growth as a control variable in
the estimation of Lerner indexes. However, none of these studies settles the issue of
causality and endogeneity.
4kets. This evidence motivates the modeling of the banking system presented
in Mandelman (2005), and is the source of the bank-supply channel in this
paper.
3 The Model
I start from a standard small open economy framework with monopolistic
competition and nominal rigidities, in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1999)
and Svensson (2000), and include the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism that
links the condition of the borrower balance sheets to the terms of credit
as developed in Gertler et al (2003). The novel feature of my setup is the
inclusion of an imperfectly competitive domestic banking system, which acts
as an intermediary between the households’ savings and the wholesalers’
ﬁnancial requirements.
Within the home economy there are households, ﬁrms, a banking sector
and a monetary authority. Foreign variables are considered to be exogenous.
Households work, save, and consume t w og r o u p so ft r a d a b l eg o o d st h a ta r e
produced at home and abroad and are imperfect substitutes.
There are three types of home ﬁrms: wholesalers, capital producers and
retailers. Due to imperfections in ﬁnancial markets, the wholesalers’ demand
for capital depends on their respective ﬁnancial positions. This capital is used
with labor to produce raw output. Banks serve as the sole source of funds
to ﬁnance capital acquisition. Competitive capital producers manufacture
new capital and adjustment costs lead to a variable price of capital. Finally,
retailers package wholesale goods together to produce ﬁnal output. They are
monopolistically competitive and set nominal prices on a staggered schedule.
T h er o l eo ft h er e t a i ls e c t o ri ss i m p l yt op r o v i d et h es o u r c eo fn o m i n a lp r i c e
stickiness.
3.1 Households
The household sector is conventional. There is a continuum of households
of unit mass. Each household works, consumes, and invests its savings in
regular deposits and foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency.
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With γ > 0,a n dγn ≥ 0.C t is a composite of tradable ﬁnal consump-
tion goods; Ht is labor supply; Wt denotes the nominal wage; Pt is the
consumer price index (CPI); Πt are real dividend payments (from owner-
ship of commercial banks and retail ﬁrms); Dt are deposits in local currency
held at commercial banks; B∗
t are foreign nominal bonds denominated in
foreign currency; St the nominal exchange rate. (1 + it) and (1 + i∗
t) are the
gross domestic and foreign nominal interest rates. Φt is the gross borrowing
premium that domestic residents must pay to obtain funds from abroad. I
assume that the country’s borrowing premium depends on foreign indebtness,
that is Φt = f(−B∗
t). The elasticity of Φt with respect to −B∗
t is positive
to avoid non-stationarity of the stock of foreign liabilities. However, it is
set close to zero to avoid altering the high-frequency dynamics of the model.
Since I assume that the intermediary cannot distinguish a household from
a risky entrepreneur, all household deposits are redirected to entrepreneurs.
The household can dissave by holding negative positions of foreign bonds.
Consumption Composites The household’s preferences over home
consumption, CH
t ,a n df o r e i g nc o n s u m p t i o n ,CF








































































Finally, the optimality condition governing the choice of foreign bonds,


















Wholesalers are risk neutral and acquire capital in each period for use in the
subsequent period. I assume that they have a ﬁnite expected horizon. This
assumption is aimed to capture the phenomenon of ongoing births and deaths
of ﬁrms, as well as to discard the possibility that wholesalers will ultimately
accumulate enough wealth to be fully self-ﬁnancing. The probability of sur-
viving to the next period is ζ. In other words, the expected horizon is 1
1−ζ.
7I assume the birth rate of wholesalers to be such that the fraction of agents
who are wholesalers is constant. To ensure that new wholesalers have funds
available when starting out, I follow Bernanke et al (2000) and assume that
each wholesaler is endowed with He
t units of labor which is supplied inelasti-
cally as a managerial input to production. We
t is received in compensation.
Capital is used in combination with labor to produce wholesale goods. The
labor input Lt is assumed to be a composite of household and managerial
labor: Lt = HΩ
t H
e(1−Ω)
t . (1−Ω) is positive but negligible in size. I normalize
He
t to unity.
The project is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ωt, that aﬀects both
the production of new goods and the eﬀective quantity of the capital in use.
The shock ωt may be regarded as a measure of the overall quality of the
capital investment. I assume that ωt is an i.i.d. random variable, distributed
continuously with E {ωt} =1 . I also assume Cobb-Douglas technology. The







where Yt is the aggregate output of wholesale goods, Kt−1 is the aggregate
amount of capital purchased by wholesalers in period t−1, Lt is labor input,
and At is an exogenous technology shock.





PW,t = Wt, (10)
and







8Demand of New Capital The wholesalers ﬁnance the acquisition of
c a p i t a lp a r t l yw i t ht h e i ro w nn e tw o r t ha v a i l a b l ea tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt and
partly with the bank credit redirected from household deposits, Dt+1. Capital
ﬁnancing is split between net worth, Nt, and credit:




Qt is the real market price of capital in units of the household consumption
composite. Net worth may be interpreted as the equity of the ﬁrm. I assume
that new equity and bond issues are prohibitively expensive, or not available
for local ﬁrms, so that all external ﬁnance is done with bank credit. I ignore
the possible existence of retained reserves, so that the overall amount of credit
in the economy must be equal to the overall amount of household deposits.
As previously remarked, all credit is in units of domestic currency.
Due to constant returns to scale, the marginal return to capital equals its
average return. Jointly with the assumptions on the idiosyncratic shock, ωt,












Supply of New Capital The marginal cost of funds to the wholesaler
depends on the ﬁnancial conditions and the banking structure. Following
Bernanke et al (2000), I assume the existence of an external ﬁnance problem
that makes uncollateralized external ﬁn a n c em o r ee x p e n s i v e .A si nG a l ea n d
Hellwig (1985), I assume the existence of a costly state veriﬁcation prob-
lem. In this case, the idiosyncratic shock ωt, is private information for the
entrepreneur. A detailed explanation of the agency problem for a monop-
olistic bank is in Appendix A. It is shown there that the external ﬁnance
risk premium, ψt, may be expressed as an increasing function of the leverage
ratio. Essentially, the external ﬁnance risk premium varies inversely with
9the wholesaler’s net worth. The greater the share of capital that can be self-










0(.) > 0, ψ(0) = 0, ψ(∞)=∞.
Notice that ψt (.) depends exclusively on the aggregate leverage ratio
and not on any wholesaler-speciﬁc variable. In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs
choose the same leverage ratio, which is the result of both constant returns to
scale in production and risk neutrality (for details, see Carlstrom and Fuerst,
1997). Equation (14) is the basis of the standard credit channel (also referred
to as the balance-sheet-eﬀect). It links movements in the wholesalers’ balance
s h e e tp o s i t i o n st ot h em a r g i n a lc o s to fc r e d i ta n d ,t h u s ,t ot h ed e m a n do f
capital. As stressed in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), endogenous ﬂuctuations


























Equation (15) is the critical component of my model. The wholesalers’
overall marginal ex-ante cost of funds is the product of three diﬀerent terms.
Et
n
(1 + it) Pt
Pt+1
o
=( 1+rt+1) indicates the bank’s gross cost of funds (i.e.
the real interest rate paid to depositors), ψt(.) is the premium aimed to cover
expected bankruptcy costs, and (1 + Ξt+1) is the gross ﬁnancial markup an
intermediary bank with monopoly power charges for carrying and executing
the contract. If such markup were zero , the bank would earn a return equal
to the safe rate that households receive for their deposits (see Appendix A
for details). Net interest margins proxy for Ξt+1 in the data and reﬂect the
10disintermediation generated by the banking system. The bank spread proxies
for the combined eﬀects of ψt(.) and (1 + Ξt+1).
To deﬁne the evolution of entrepreneurial aggregate net worth, let Vt













While unforecastable variation in assets prices, Qt, is the main source of
unanticipated returns, unexpected CPI variation plays the same role for the
liabilities. Finally, aggregate net worth is the result of a linear combination
of Vt and the managerial wage:
Nt = ζVt + W
e
t /Pt. (17)
Exiting wholesalers in period t consume their remaining resources: Ce
t =( 1 −
ζ)Vt. I assume that wholesalers have preferences over domestic and foreign
goods identical to household’s preferences.
3.2.2 Capital Producers
The construction of new capital requires as input an investment good, It,























Competitive capital producers choose the optimal mix of foreign and do-































I assume that there are increasing marginal adjustment costs in the pro-
duction of capital. Capital producers operate a constant returns to scale






for an aggregate investment expenditure of It. Ψ(.) is increasing and concave.
Kt−1 is the second input in capital production. Capital producers rent this
capital after it has been used to produce ﬁnal output within the period. Let
rl












In order to capture the delayed response of investment observed in the
data, I follow Bernanke et al (2000) and assume that capital producers make
their plans to produce new capital one period in advance. Therefore, the














































=1 .I t a l s o f o l l o w s t h a t Q is normalized to one and, hence,
rental payments are second order and negligible in terms of both steady-
state and model dynamics. Equation (22) implies that Qt increases in It
Kt−1
as predicted by standard Q theory of investment. The adjustment costs
generate a variable price of capital, crucial for the balance-sheet-eﬀect.






Kt−1 +( 1− δ)Kt−1, (24)
12where δ is the depreciation rate.
3.2.3 The Retail Sector and Price Setting
Monopolistic competition occurs at the retail level. Retailers buy wholesale
goods and diﬀerentiate products by packaging them together and adding a
brand name.
Let Y H
t (z) be the good sold by retailer z. Final good domestic output is














T h ep r i c eo ft h ec o m p o s i t eﬁnal domestic good, PH













Domestic households, capital producers, and the foreign country buy ﬁnal














To introduce price inertia, I assume that the retailer is free to change its
price in a given period only with probability 1−θ, following Calvo (1983). Let
PH
o,t denote the home production price set by retailers that are able to change
prices at t,a n dY H
o,t(z) the resulting demand at this price level. Retailer z






















is the household or “shareholder” in-
tertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Because the price may be ﬁxed for
some time, retailers set prices based on the expected future path of marginal


































ξ−1 is the retailers’ desired gross markup over wholesale prices. Given
that a fraction θ of retailers do not change their price in period t the domestic


















By combining the last two equations, and then log-linearizing, it is possi-
ble to obtain the familiar optimization-based Phillips curve that arises from
an environment of time-dependent staggered price setting.







Then, it is possible to obtain an economy-wide inﬂation, combining equa-
tion (4) with the results above.
In Appendix B, I consider the case in which local currency pricing results
in a delay in the exchange rate pass-through mechanism. There, I simply
assume that imported goods prices are adjusted in the same manner as prices
in the domestic sector.
3.3 The Banking System
I assume that the banking system is highly segmented into a large number,
n, of sectors or regions (niches). The size of each niche is the same, and
14each of them is served by an established bank (incumbent), l, that possesses
a local monopoly and therefore ﬁnances an equal fraction
Dt+1
Pt
n of the total
entrepreneurial capital acquisition. Each incumbent can serve only its own
niche because of an implicit collusion agreement that is described later. This
intermediary chooses a net markup for its niche, Ξt+1, at the beginning of








The constant υl is the cost-eﬃciency level, and captures any idiosyn-
cratic operational (in)eﬃciency and information (dis)advantages any bank
may have. I assume that υl is drawn from a common uniform distribution
U(υ) with support on [0,λ] a tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h eb a n ko p e r a t i o n s . υl is
private information and is unknown to banks outside the niche. The cost of
serving depends on the amount of credit ﬁnanced (the size of the market). In
addition, the banking system possesses operational economies of scope and
scale over operating costs. Thus, I assume that 0 < τ < 1.
For notational ease, I assume that the operational costs depend on the
real amount of credit ﬁnanced at t (i.e.
Dt+1
Pt ), but are eﬀectively incurred at
t h et i m ep r o ﬁts are realized. Therefore in period t +1the bank obtains the
following ex-post real proﬁts for carrying and monitoring the bank contract
(between depositors and entrepreneurs) at period t :




















The ﬁrst term are the entrepreneur payments net of bankruptcy costs and
the term in brackets captures the cost of funds (i.e. payments to depositors)
plus operating costs. Using the fact that the ex-post real rate is (1+rt+1)=
(1 + it) Pt
Pt+1, and that Ξt+1rt+1 ≈ 0 for the parameter values I consider, we














Entry and mergers I assume that entry is possible in this banking
system, but that it occurs in successive stages. Entrants in the “banking
system” at time t only start competing in the “niche” at time t +1 , which
introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model. Right after the entry
decision is eﬀectively taken (i.e. when the sunk costs are incurred), the
entrant is already inside the banking system, but only at the “wholesale
level”. Hence, in principle, during period t it is able to temporarily serve any
of the n niches until it is ﬁnally established in one of them in t+1.T h ea i m
is to capture the idea of entry taking place in the wholesale market ﬁrst with
the ultimate goal of spreading later to the retail segment (niches).9
T h ee n t r ys t a g e sa r ea sf o l l o w s :
(A) At the beginning of period t, a potential competitor, j, attempts to
enter the banking system. At no cost, it draws its cost-eﬃciency level, υj,
from the same common uniform distribution U(υ).
(B) After learning its own υj, the potential competitor chooses whether
to enter the banking system and ﬁght for one of the niches next period or
to withdraw from the banking system. The closer υj is to zero, the more
eﬃcient the potential entrant is, and the easier to take over a niche. I assume
that the number of total draws is large enough that at least some potential
competitors enter the banking system every period.
(C) To enter the banking system (and eventually ﬁght for one of the
niches) an outsider has to incur ﬁxed sunk entry costs, mt, at the beginning
of period t.10 mt is exogenous and measured in units of the consumption com-
posite. We can also interpret changes in mt as changes in entry regulations.
(D) In principle, during period t, entrants are able to temporarily serve
any (or even all) of the n niches at the “wholesale level” until ﬁnally estab-
9Additionally, we could say that entrants need to incur in one-period learning process
to make their idiosyncratic cost-eﬃciency level eﬀective at the regional level.
10As mentioned above, we can include in them advertisement costs or the costs of
constructing a network of branches and ATMs.
16Figure 1: Entry Stages









where λ ≥ υl for every l; given the common uniform distribution U(υ)
with support on [0,λ]. As in Petersen and Rajan (1994), I assume that
retail banks that are physically closer to their customers have lower costs of
transacting with both ﬁrms and depositors.
(E) For simplicity, I assume that any entrant is able to enter only one of
the niches (i.e. multi-sectorial entry is not possible). The collusion agreement
implies that the potential competitor knows the cost-eﬃciency distribution
of the banking system, U(υ), but cannot infer the particular υ0
ls of each
incumbent. So that, entrants are indiﬀerent about the niche to ﬁght for.
17I assume that once inside the banking system they randomly choose which
particular niche to enter at the end of period t.
( F )A tt h ev e r yb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o dt+1,t h ee n t r a n ti si n s i d et h en i c h e
a n di sa b l et ol e a r nt h ei n c u m b e n t ’ sυl. Bertrand competition occurs and
the following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION 1 Under Bertrand competition, only two possible out-
comes are possible. If υj > υl, the entrant fails and is forced to merge. If
υj < υl the entrant successfully displaces the incumbent and forces it to
merge. The optimal strategy for the loser is to merge immediately and not to
c o m p e t e .T h eo n l yv i s i b l eo u t c o m ei st h ep o s s i b l ec h a n g eo ft h ei n c u m b e n ta t
the very beginning of t +1 .11
Proof. See Appendix C.
(G) If successful the new incumbent keeps the niche until it is hit by an
exit-inducing shock that occurs with probability δD ∈ (0,1) in every period.
For simplicity, I do not model endogenous exit that is not driven by the afore
mentioned Bertrand competition. The “death” shock is independent of the
bank’s eﬃciency level. I assume that the empty niche left by every dead bank
is immediately ﬁlled by an entrant. Right after drawing an eﬃciency level,
the entrant is able to use the existent network left by the dead bank (avoiding
any sunk costs as well as the time-to-build lag). The number of banks and the
frequency of “death” is high enough so that E(υl)=λ
2, and U(υ) describes
the cost-eﬃciency distribution of all incumbents in the ﬁnancial system.
Implicit Collusion Agreement and Limit Pricing I assume that
entrants are liquidity constrained and cannot make looses after incurring sunk
costs. In these circumstances, the pricing strategy, Ξt+1, must ensure that
none of the new competitors at the wholesale level can obtain any expected
positive proﬁts if they decide to oﬀer a net markup below Ξt+1 and serve the
niche.12 That is:
11By deﬁnition the point likelihood of υj = υl is null.
12By assumption, the customers remain loyal to the local incumbent bank if the level of














Notice, however, that low cost-eﬃciency incumbents have the incentive to
“signal” their idiosyncratic eﬃciency to new entrants by oﬀering a markup
below the level that makes (36) hold as an equality (hereafter, the binding
limit). From (34), entrants in the banking system know that only more eﬃ-






make proﬁts. Therefore, these incumbents have incentives to oﬀer markups
levels somewhat below the binding limit in (36) to inﬂuence and redirect
entrants’ decisions toward less-eﬃcient niches. The higher is the amount of
entry in the banking system, the higher the incentives to protect the niche
by lowering current markups and proﬁts. In this scenario, incumbents “com-
pete” to deter entry in their own niches. Instead, I assume that there exists
an implicit collusion agreement among the incumbents that enforces the se-
crecy of the idiosyncratic cost-eﬃciency levels.
I assume that any implicit collusion agreement must necessarily satisfy
all the incumbents to be possible. Consequently, a cartel markup below
the binding limit in (36) does not work. The uniform distribution with
support on [0,λ], and the assumption that n is very large, implies that such
cartel markup level can result in losses for members with cost-eﬃciency levels
in the neighborhood of λ. The negative proﬁts force defections from the
agreement; defections that actually reveal the high cost-eﬃciency level of
those defectors.13 Therefore, the arrangement must consist of a markup














If any of the banks attempt to charge a markup below the binding limit,
one of the members of the cartel immediately serves such niche at the whole-
sale level. The punishment consists of establishing a markup just below the
13I assume that a single defector can transform the tacit agreement into an explicit
one. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), such scenario carries incommensurable legal
sanctions for the members of the cartel.
19one chosen by the defector, Ξ
def
t+1 − ε (ε is negligible in size). The result-
ing negative proﬁts for serving the niche under this condition are equally
















I assume that, in principle, such punishment would take place only if there
is a single monopolistic bank serving the niche (so that Proposition 1 holds).
In other words, the cartel allows Bertrand competition to occur inside the
niche to guarantee a monopolistic structure in which the number of banks in
the banking system never exceeds n (one bank per niche). Finally, I assume
that the amount of entry and the exogenous exit inducing shock (positively
associated with the discount factor) is high enough so that incumbents are
better oﬀ when committing to the collusive level in (37).
As a result, the pricing decision is exactly the same in all niches. Since
all the niches are of the same size, we can interpret this relationship as the
pricing decision taken by the representative bank of this economy.
Hence, for every period t, expected proﬁts for each incumbent l are:







Equations (37) and (39) can be interpreted as follows: The greater the
aggregate investment, the bigger the size of all niches, and the higher the
competitive pressure of the new entrants. In turn, this forces the incum-
bent to oﬀer lower markups. These countercyclical markups, jointly with
the standard balance-sheet-eﬀect, constitute the “broad” ﬁnancial accelera-
tor at work in equation (15). Relative to the standard credit channel, this
“broad” accelerator magniﬁes the propagation and ampliﬁcation of shocks to
the economy.
Entry decision Banks are forward looking and correctly anticipate
their expected stream of proﬁts. After drawing a υj, a potential entrant
decides to enter the banking system only if the expected post-entry present




















− ms > 0. (40)
Banks discount future proﬁts using the household’s stochastic discount
factor, adjusted for the probability of survival. The pre-entry probability of
defeating the incumbent and taking-over the niche is 1−
υj
λ =P r ( υj <E (υl)).
Equations (40) and (39) imply that entry is procyclical (i.e. entry increases
when the amount of credit, purchase of new capital and the economic activity
are high). The larger the discount factor and the probability of the exit-
inducing shock, the stronger the procyclicality.
Entry is aﬀected by market regulation that alters the value of mt.14 Equa-
tion (40) implies that the higher is mt, the lower the resulting entry threshold
value of υj, and thus the lower the amount of entry in the banking system
(and vice versa). But, the higher is mt, the more likely entries are success-
ful when ﬁghting for the niche. These results are in line with the empirical
evidence that entry exerts a sizable impact in small, underdeveloped, and
regulated markets.
T h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ne ﬀectively prohibit entry in the banking system by
setting mt →∞ . In this case, countercyclical limit pricing is not necessary,
and incumbents are able to establish a standard collusive agreement.
3.4 The Foreign Sector
The small open economy takes all foreign variables as given. I use a very
simple foreign demand for the home tradable, or exports, CH∗





¤1−$ . Following Gertler et al (2003), I postulate


















¤1−$ , 0 ≤ $ ≤ 1, (41)
14As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), changes in sunk entry costs alter the free-entry
condition.
21P∗
t is the nominal price of the foreign tradable good (in units of the
foreign currency) and Y ∗
t is real foreign output. I assume balanced trade in
the steady state and normalize the steady-state terms of trade at unity.
3.5 The Resource Constraint












3 . 6 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yR u l e s
I ﬁrst consider shocks to the economy under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime,
in which the central bank manages the nominal interest rate according to
a Taylor rule. In this case, the policy instrument is the nominal interest
rate. The central bank adopts a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting rule that has
the nominal interest rate adjust to deviations of CPI inﬂation and domestic
output from their respective target values. Let Y 0 denote the steady-state
level of output. The feedback rule is given by:










with γπ > 1 and γy > 0, and where (1 + r) is the steady-state gross real
interest rate. The target net rate of inﬂation is assumed to be zero. The
central bank therefore adjusts the interest rate to ensure that over time the
economy meets the inﬂation target, but with ﬂexibility in the short run so
as to meet stabilization objectives. I assume that the central bank is able to
credibly commit to the Taylor rule.
I then consider a pure ﬁxed exchange rate regime in which the central
bank simply keeps the nominal exchange rate pegged at a predetermined
level, i.e.
22St = ¯ S, for all t. (44)
With the description of the monetary policy, the speciﬁcation of the model
is complete. The distinctive aspect of this general equilibrium model relative
to a benchmark small open economy (SOE) setup with nominal rigidities and
monopolistic competition in real goods markets is characterized by equations
(37), (17) and (15). The ﬁrst one determines the limit pricing strategy chosen
by the incumbent banks, the second one characterizes the evolution of net
worth, and the last one describes how the combined feedback eﬀect of these
two events inﬂuences capital demand. If we restrict the net ﬁnancial markup,
Ξt+1, to zero in (15), we eﬀectively shut oﬀ the bank-supply channel and the
model reverts to a SOE model with the conventional ﬁnancial accelerator
included ( i.e. with only the standard balance-sheet-eﬀect). Similarly, this
last eﬀect may be turned oﬀ by restricting ψt to one in (15).
4 Solution of the Model
4.1 Model parameterization
The quantitative analysis aims to capture the broad features of a represen-
tative emerging economy for which ﬁnancial frictions are relevant. I set the
world interest rate to 4 percent annually, an number commonly used in the
literature, which also pins down the quarterly discount factor β at 0.99. I
follow Galí and Monacelli (2005) and set the Frisch intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in labor supply, 1
γn, at 3. Average hours worked relative to total
hours available are ﬁxed at 1
3 in steady state, which is the standard value in
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature. Empirical evidence establishes low
sensitivity of expected consumption growth to real interest rates in emerg-
ing economies. Therefore I ﬁx γ =4 , which is in line with intertemporal
elasticity estimates found in Reinhart and Vegh (1993) and Uribe (1997).
I set the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for the consumption com-
posite, ρ, at 0.5. Since consumption goods are thought to have a higher degree
of substitution than intermediate or investment goods, I mimic Gertler et al
(2003) and ﬁx the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for the investment
composite, ρI, at 0.25. Finally, I follow Céspedes et al (2000) and assume
23that the share of domestic goods in the consumption and investment tradable
composites, γC and γI, are both 0.6, consistent with observed shares.
I assign the conventional values of 0.35 and 0.025 to the capital share, α,
and the steady state quarterly depreciation rate, δ, respectively. As in Galí
and Monacelli (2005), I set the steady-state markup in the tradable goods
markets at 1.2. The elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the
investment capital ratio is taken to be 2, which is the estimate that King and
Wolman (1996) found using aggregate data. As common in the literature on
Calvo pricing, I assume that the probability of the price not adjusting, θ,
is 0.75. The ratio of capital to net worth in the steady state is set at 2 (or
equivalently, a leverage ratio of 0.5). This steady-state leverage ratio is the
one chosen in Bernanke et al (2000) and is also in line with new estimations
Kamil (2004) found for a set of emerging economies. I assume a low degree of
ﬁnancial development with high bankruptcy and monitoring costs, therefore
I set the steady-state annual external ﬁnance risk premium at 4.5%, roughly
250 basis points higher than U.S. historical data. Following, Bernanke et al
(2000), I choose the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect
the leverage ratio, η, to be 0.051 and the entrepreneurs’ death rate, (1 − ζ)
equal to 0.0272. I also ﬁx the entrepreneurial labor share of the total wage
bill at a negligible 0.01%. In order to assess the quantitative relevance of the
monopolistic banking setup, I replicate the data in Table 1. Thus, I set the
steady-state annual value of the net ﬁnancial markup at 380 basis points and
then calibrate τ so that its standard deviation (as a percent deviation from
the steady-state value) is around 23%.
Regarding the parameters of the reduced-form export demand function,
I set the elasticity χ equal to 0.3 and the inertia parameter, $, equal to 0.25
which is the same value as in Gertler et al (2003). The steady-state ratio of
exports to domestic output is set equal to 0.3.
The Taylor Rule coeﬃcients on CPI inﬂation and domestic output gap,
γπ and γy, are set equal to 2 and 0.75, respectively, in line with a range of
standard estimates.
4.2 Foreign interest rate shock
I ﬁrst analyze the transmission mechanism of this setup. In order to capture a
sudden capital outﬂow, I consider an unanticipated one hundred basis point
24increase in the foreign nominal interest rate that obeys a ﬁrst order auto-
correlation process that persists at the rate of 0.9 per quarter.
The model cannot be solved analytically so I employ numeric methods.
I ﬁnd the rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation
around the steady state and obtain the recursive equilibrium law of motion
using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.
In Figure 2, I plot the response of twelve key variables assuming perfect
competition in the banking system under ﬂexible exchange rates. I consider
both the standard SOE model (dashed line) and the same model with the
conventional ﬁnancial accelerator included (solid line). In other words, bank
m a r k u p sr e m a i na tz e r ot h r o u g h o u tt h ee x p e r i m e n t .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ed o m e s -
tic nominal interest rate is not tied to the foreign interest rate, and is instead
governed by the feedback rule in equation (43). The rise in the foreign inter-
est rate produces an immediate depreciation in the domestic currency which
in turn prompts an increase in the foreign demand for home production.
Household consumption falls owing to the increased cost of imported goods
following the depreciation. Incomplete substitution causes consumption in
domestic goods to fall, as well as the price of domestic goods. However, con-
sumption of domestic goods falls by less than consumption of imported goods
which, jointly with higher exports, moderates the overall eﬀect on local out-
put. The counteracting eﬀects of lower domestic prices but more expensive
imports causes the overall CPI inﬂation rate to increase only slightly. Given
t h eT a y l o rr u l es p e c i ﬁcation, a small output drop jointly with moderate inﬂa-
tion dictates a negligible change in the real interest rate. Negligible changes
in real rates and modest changes in the inﬂation rate imply that neither asset
prices nor the real value of the liabilities are signiﬁcantly altered. With the
critical assumption of liabilities exclusively denominated in local currency,
such behavior of the balance sheets implies that the balance-sheet-eﬀect is
negligible and the external ﬁnance premium wholesalers face is insigniﬁcant.
Consequently, the drop in investment is moderate, and reﬂects only a lower
price for capital as a result of the recessive outlook and a relatively more
expensive foreign investment good composite.15
Therefore, the standard ﬁnancial accelerator fails to deliver any ampli-
ﬁcation and propagation mechanism in this context. In principle, ﬂexible
exchange rates and liabilities fully denominated in local currency allow the
15The eslasticity of substitution for the investment good is relatively low. Therefore it
becomes signﬁcantly more expensive after the depreciation of the local currency.
25economy to isolate itself from foreign interest rate shocks. Existent models
are forced to include liabilities mostly denominated in foreign currency to
improve upon their empirical performance.
The results are diﬀerent if we also recognize the presence of monopoly
power in the banking system. See Figure 3. The fall in investment causes
the ﬁnancial market to shrink and the banking markups to increase. Higher
ﬁnancial markups are reﬂected not only in a direct increment in the real
cost of borrowing for entrepreneurs, but also in lower asset prices that de-
teriorate the position of balance sheets (and indirectly increase borrowing
costs). Therefore, investment is signiﬁcantly aﬀected. The “broad” ﬁnancial
accelerator propagates ﬁnancial disturbances, ampliﬁes the business cycle,
and alters the evolution of the capital stock throughout the experiment. As
a result, real wages fall signiﬁcantly, for two reasons. Firstly, a less capital
intensive technology aﬀects the marginal productivity of labor. Secondly the
recessive pattern of the cycle increase ex-post markups in the real goods mar-
ket and thus aﬀects wages. Lower wages are associated with lower labor eﬀort
and output. Permanent income theory applies: The combined eﬀect of lower
wages and work eﬀort aﬀects household income and causes consumption to
remain relatively lower. To ameliorate the negative impact these events have
on domestic output, the central bank is forced to be less aggressive when in-
creasing the interest rates. Lower rates moderate the fall in consumption and
deliver a more robust depreciation that improves the international position
of the economy.
In Figure 5, I plot the response of key variables in a scenario in which
the monetary authority is committed to defend a ﬁxed nominal exchange
rate peg. In the baseline scenario with the bank-supply channel turned-oﬀ
(dashed line), the domestic nominal interest rate rises to match the increase
in the foreign interest rate so that (8) holds. Due to nominal price rigidities,
there is also a signiﬁcant increase in the real interest rate that in turns
induces a contraction in output. The fall in the demand for domestic goods
causes domestic prices to fall, but in this case foreign goods prices remain
unaﬀected. The economy enters a deﬂationary spiral in which much higher
real interest rates generate a sharp fall in household consumption and asset
valuation. The dual presence of a negative debt-deﬂation impact on the
liability side on the one hand, and lower assets prices on the other hand,
severely damage the ﬁnancial position of ﬁrms. Hence, immediately after
the shock, the conventional ﬁnancial accelerator starts working by raising
the leverage ratio and the external ﬁnance premium, thereby magnifying the
26investment drop. Even if the nominal exchange rate does not change in this
experiment, the economy improves its international position (with higher
exports and greater import substitution) as a result of the local recession
and the deﬂationary spiral.
With monopolistic competition in the banking sector, the ampliﬁcation
mechanism is even more robust (see the solid line). A shrinking ﬁnancial
market causes bank markups to increase and asset prices to fall, contributing
to a further deterioration of balance sheets. The feedback mechanism behind
the two channels of this “broad” ﬁnancial accelerator increases borrowing
costs for entrepreneurs, amplifying the response of investment and other real
variables.
For completeness, in Fig 6 and 7, I show the balance-sheet and the bank-
supply channels acting independently. In both ﬁgures, the dashed line refers
to the SOE model without ﬁnancial frictions. In this baseline setup the real
cost of borrowing for wholesalers is just the real interest rate paid to deposi-
t o r s .W ec a no b s e r v e ,t h a tt h et w oc h a nnels work in the same direction and
contribute independently to the same phenomenon. However, the internal
propagation mechanism is more robust when they interact together in the
complete model. See Figure 8.
4.3 Macroeconomic Variability
To assess the quantitative relevance of the model, in Table 2 I display the-
oretical second moments (as percent deviations from steady state values)
obtained though the frequency domain technique depicted in Uhlig (1999)
for the parametrization already described. To get the estimates, I set the
standard deviation of the productivity innovations at 0.00712, in line with
the RBC literature, and the standard deviation of the foreign interest rate
shock equal to 0.0065, which is also well within the range used in the lit-
erature (see Batini et al 2001, and Nelson and Neiss, 2001). The empirical
m o m e n t sf o rt h er e l e v a n tv a r i a b l e sa r et a k e nf r o mt h es e r i e su s e di nA g u i a r
and Gopinath (2004). Output is real GDP, investment is gross ﬁxed capital
formation and household consumption is private consumption. These series
are deseasonalized. For comparison purposes, both empirical and theoretical
series are HP ﬁltered with a smoothness parameter of 1600 so that only the
cyclical component remains.
27Notice that I purposely selected countries that de facto kept their ex-
change rates ﬁxed during most of the span of the data available. Following
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002), I consider periods in which there is either a de
facto peg or at least a de facto crawling band that never exceeds the +/- 5%
range. I proceed in this way for two reasons. Although some countries eﬀec-
tively allowed the exchange rate to ﬂoat, it is diﬃcult to determine whether
they actually committed to a Taylor Rule in the period under consideration.
Besides, the model assumes that liabilities are denominated in domestic cur-
rency, but in fact, most of the emerging economies have at least a fraction of
ﬁrms’ liabilities denominated in foreign currency.16 In principle, it could be
the case that some of the accounted volatility simply reﬂects ﬁrms’ leverage
ratios responding to changes in the exchange rate. In summary, the speciﬁ-
cation that assumes a ﬂoating exchange rate may not be suitable for making
historical comparisons with the data available.
Sample averages of the empirical moments for the eight emerging economies
depicted in Table 1 are reported in the last column of Table 2. The stan-
dard deviations for output, consumption and investment are 2.79, 3.60 and
10.75 respectively. The ﬁrst four columns report four diﬀerent theoretical sce-
narios: baseline SOE model, only monopolistic banking sector added, only
balance-sheet-eﬀect added, and both interacting together. Neither the stan-
dard credit channel nor the sole presence of a monopolistic banking can cap-
ture the historic investment volatility. In each case, the standard deviation
for investment is 6.79 and 6.41 respectively. The fourth column display-
ing the results of the complete model with the “broad” ﬁnancial accelerator
shows that the richer model is actually the best one at replicating the actual
volatility of real variables found in the data. In this case, the output and
investment standard deviations are 2.28 and 10.90, respectively.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
Now I consider how the welfare of the representative household is aﬀected by
the presence of monopoly power in the banking system. The welfare criterion
16The model can be easily extended to consider the case of liabilities heavily denomi-
nated in foreign (hard) currency. Depending on the calibration, the impact of a exchange
rate depreciation under ﬂexible exchange rates maybe less or more damaging than the
contraction in asset prices under ﬁxed exchange rates.
28is based on a second-order Taylor expansion of the representative household’s



















Variables with hats denote the percent deviation from the steady state,
and variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values. The wel-
fare results for the main scenarios previously discussed are listed in Table
3. In each case, I report the percent increase in steady-state consumption
that makes the household as well oﬀ as it would be in a baseline scenario
with ﬂexible exchange rates and perfect competition in the banking system.
The results conﬁrm that the representative household is better oﬀ in the
baseline scenario. In principle, households would be willing to accept a mo-
nopolistic banking system if steady-state consumption is 6.43% higher. If
they are also forced to accept ﬁxed exchange rates, the required increment
is 7.20%. Monopolistic ﬁnancial intermediaries aﬀect welfare through two
diﬀerent channels. First, the bank markup generates a permanent disinter-
mediation between borrowers and entrepreneurs that results in lower steady-
state levels of capital accumulation, output, and hence consumption. Second,
the countercyclical pattern of such markups increases the volatility of real
variables, ampliﬁes the business cycle, and thus reduces welfare. Finally,
the transmission mechanism implies a much larger propagation of external
shocks under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The modeling of the banking system captures several features of the empirical
evidence observed in emerging economies. Entry occurs at the wholesale level
and spreads later into a highly segmented retail market. If banking markets
are underdeveloped, small, and regulated, only lower-cost banks attempt
to enter the market and compete. However, their chances of a successful
take over are higher than in a highly developed banking system. Although
changes in the market structure do not aﬀect the markups, entry threats
29force incumbents to set lower markups to deter the competitive pressure.
Economies of scale facilitate entry in boom periods, and vice versa, generating
countercyclical markups.
At a general equilibrium level, I show that this behavior of the banking
system generates a bank-supply channel that interacts with the evolution
of the ﬁrms’ balance sheets to reinforce the credit channel: Credit is more
expensive during recessions, and ﬁrms and households postpone investment
and work decisions, leading to a deeper recession. Thus, market power in
the banking system increases the volatility of real variables, ampliﬁes the
business cycle, and reduces welfare.
In the calibration of the model for a representative small open developing
economy, I showed that the inclusion of imperfect competition in the banking
system helps to explain the relatively large investment volatility typically
experienced in these countries. These conclusions are robust to diﬀerent
monetary regimes. First, I consider the case of a monetary authority able
to commit to a Taylor-type rule under ﬂoating rates. Then, I allow for the
possibility of a central bank in a position of having to defend a ﬁxed exchange
rate peg. In either case, I show that the monetary authority is unable to avoid
a sizable decrease in investment after a negative external shock. The results
hold even if the speed with which exchange rate adjustments feed through
to the consumer price index is slow and liabilities are fully denominated in
local currency. In contrast, the sole presence of the standard balance-sheet
channel fails to deliver any internal propagation mechanism in this context.
There are several extensions of the analysis that can be pursued in fu-
ture work. The model may contribute to explaining the observed decline
in real variables during ﬁnancial crisis episodes. It could be easily modiﬁed
to study the impact of currency depreciation when liabilities are heavily de-
nominated in foreign currency. Additionally, the model may also be extended
to capture the consequences of long-term relationships between banks and
their customers. Regional banks in developing economies are usually engaged
in long-term relationships with small domestic entrepreneurs who otherwise
would have no access to the credit markets. Therefore, entry threats, which
force low proﬁt margins, can increase the degree of ﬁnancial fragility and
disrupt these relationships.
30Appendix A: The Monopolistic Bank Contract.
In this appendix, I add monopoly power to the partial equilibrium con-
tracting problem in the non-stochastic steady-state developed in Bernanke
et al (2000).
Let proﬁts per unit of capital equal ωRk, where ω²[0,∞) is an idiosyn-
cractic shock with E(ω)=1 . I assume F(x)=P r [ ω <x ] is a continuous
probability distribution with F(0) = 0. Id e n o t ef(ω) the pdf of ω. Let vari-
ables without time subscripts denote steady-state values. The entrepreneur
borrows QK − N to invest K units of capital in a project. The total return
on capital is thus ωRkQK . I assume that ω i su n k n o w nt ob o t ht h ee n t r e p r e -
neur and the lender prior to the investment decision. After the investment
decision is made, the lender can only observe ω by paying monitoring costs
µωRkQK, where 0 <µ<1. The “required” return on lending for the bank
e q u a l st h ec o s to ff u n d s( d e p o s i tr a t e ) ,R, times the steady-state gross bank
markup, i.e. (1 + Ξ)R.
The optimal bank contract speciﬁes a cutoﬀ value ¯ ω such that if ω ≥ ¯ ω,
the borrower pays the lender the ﬁxed amount ¯ ωRkQK, and keeps the equity
(ω − ¯ ω)RkQK. If ω < ¯ ω, the borrower receives nothing, while the bank
monitors the borrower and receives (1 − µ)ωRkQK in residual claims net of
monitoring costs. In equilibrium, the bank earns an expected return equal












kQK =( 1 + Ξ)R(QK−N).
(46)
The optimal contract maximizes the payoﬀ to the entrepreneur subject









subject to equation (46).
Given constant returns to scale, the cutoﬀ ¯ ω determines the division of
expected gross proﬁts RkQK between the bank and lender. The expected








Similarly, I deﬁne the expected monitoring costs , µG(¯ ω) as:




The net share of proﬁt sg o i n gt ot h eb a n ki sΓ(¯ ω) − µG(¯ ω), and the
share going to the entrepreneur is 1 − Γ(¯ ω). By deﬁnition, Γ(¯ ω) satisﬁes
0 ≤ Γ(¯ ω) ≤ 1.
The optimal contracting problem with non-stochastic monitoring may
now be written as:
max
K,¯ ω
(1 − Γ(¯ ω))R
kQK (50)
subject to:
[Γ(¯ ω) − µG(¯ ω)]R
kQK =( 1+Ξ)R(QK − N). (51)
Let s = Rk
(1+Ξ)R, denote the risk premium on external funds and k =
QK
N = K
N, the steady-state ratio of capital to net worth. Deﬁning ι as the
Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that the banks earn their “required”
rate of return in expectation, the ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution












Γ0(¯ ω) − µG0(¯ ω)
. (54)
Where
32Υ(¯ ω)=1− Γ(¯ ω)+ι(¯ ω)[Γ(¯ ω) − µG(¯ ω)]. (55)
Equations (52) and (53) provide an implicit relationship between capital
expenditures per unit of net worth k(¯ ω) and the risk premium on external
funds that is the basis of equation (14).
k(¯ ω)=κ(s(¯ ω)) κ
0(s) > 0. (56)
Notice, ﬁnally, that the set up of this contracting problem allows us to
















The ﬁrst term in the right hand side, Rk
tQt−1Kt−1, is the average return
on capital and the expression in brackets is the aggregate ex-post costs of
borrowing for the entrepreneurs. That is, Rt(1+Ξt)
Dt+1
Pt is the net payment
banks receive and µ
R ¯ ω
0 ωRk
tQt−1Kt−1f(ω)dω are aggregate default costs paid
by the entrepreneurs. The default costs are captured by the external ﬁnance
risk premium. (57) may be used in order to express (17) in log-linear form
as:




















ϑ (ˆ Yt − ˆ Pt+1 − ˆ PW,t) a collection of terms of second order impor-
tance.
33Appendix B: Local Currency Pricing and Incomplete Pass-
through.
The speed by which exchange rate adjustments feed through to the con-
sumer price index in emerging markets has received widespread attention in
the last few years.17 The aim of this section is both to highlight the im-
portance of this issue in the construction of monetary policy rules and to
proceed with a sensitivity analysis. In the baseline model, I assumed com-
plete pass-through; here I allow for the possibility that there is some delay
between movements in the exchange rate and the adjustment of imported
good prices. To introduce price inertia, I consider the case in which monop-
olistic competition also occurs among foreign goods retailers that face the
same degree of price rigidity as domestic goods retailers.
In this case, the law of one price holds only at the wholesale level. Let
PF
W,t be the wholesale price of foreign goods in the domestic currency. The
law of one price then implies PF
W,t = StP∗
t . Instead, the optimal price set by





















































which replaces (31) in the baseline setup. As a sensitivity analysis, I
analyze the transmission mechanism of this alternative setup. As before, I
consider an unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the foreign
nominal interest rate.
In the baseline case with full-pass-through, the Taylor rule speciﬁcation
dictates that the central bank must always prevent a large exchange rate
depreciation in order to control CPI inﬂation. See Figure 3 again. Although
the nominal interest rate is not tied to the foreign interest rate (as in the
17See for instance, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Devereaux and Lane (2003).
34case of ﬁxed exchange rates), a large depreciation is prevented through a
moderate increment in the nominal interest rate. The policy prescription in
this scenario resembles the case of a “dirty” ﬂoat exchange rate regime.
Results diﬀer in the case of incomplete-pass-through. See Figure 4. Here,
the monetary authority is able to decrease nominal interest rates while per-
mitting a large currency depreciation. However, CPI inﬂation reacts very
sluggishly because of the price rigidities among foreign goods retailers. The
lower real interest rates, together with a large exchange rate depreciation,
improves both the country’s ability to absorb the negative shock and its in-
ternational position. Therefore, the decrease in output is even more moderate
and very short lasting.
Nonetheless, even in this scenario, which resembles a “pure” ﬂoating ex-
change rate regime, the decline in investment is sizeable in the presence of
imperfect competition in the banking system.
35Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1.
Deﬁne the break-even level of markups θl and θj for the incumbent and
the entrant. The break-even level is equal to the value of the net markup































t+1 > θj. The bank l has no demand and its proﬁts are
zero. But, if bank l charges Ξl
t+1 = Ξ
j
t+1 − ε (where ε is positive but nil), it
gets the entire niche and has a positive proﬁt Ξ
j
t+1 − ε − θl > 0.






t+1 > θj. In that case they share the niche, and each
one serves half of it. But if bank j reduces its price slightly to Ξ
j
t+1 − ε, it
gets all the niche. Nonetheless, bank j will never charge Ξ
j
t+1 < θj, because
it would make a negative proﬁt. It follows that bank l can charge Ξl
t+1 =
θj − ε and guarantee for itself all the niche while obtaining a positive proﬁt
θj − ε − θl > 0.
Therefore bank j is indiﬀerent between staying or leaving the niche, since
w i l ln o tb ea b l et os e r v ei t .I fb a n kl oﬀers bank j a negligible but positive
amount of output ε so as to merge, it is in the best interest of bank j to
accept it. A symmetric analysis holds when υj < υl.¥
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Table 1: Net Interest Margins Statistics. 
 
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES                                     EMERGING ECONOMIES 
COUNTRY MEAN  ST  DEV(1) STDEV(2) COUNTRY MEAN  STDEV(1)  ST  DEV(2) 
United Kingdom  0.020  0.003  15.8 Argentina  0.070  0.031  44.2 
Luxembourg 0.008  0.002  25.0 Israel  0.030  0.005  15.9 
Ireland 0.013  0.003  18.8  South Korea  0.022  0.003  14.9 
Japan 0.019  0.003  15.8  Malaysia 0.028  0.004  13.8 
Switzerland 0.017  0.003 15.8 Mexico  0.054  0.010  19.0 
Germany 0.026  0.004  14.1  Philippines 0.040  0.008  20.3 
USA 0.040  0.003  6.2  Slovak Rep  0.031  0.009  28.6 
       Thailand 0.025  0.008  32.3 
Sample Average  0.020  -------  15.9  Sample Average 0.038 ------  23.6 
 
Notes: The variable in consideration is Net Interest Margins (Bank Markups) for the period 1991-2000. Sample Mean, 
Standard Deviation (1), and Standard Deviation as a percentage deviation from individual mean values (2) are reported. 
Source: Database on Bank Structure, World Bank Research Department (1999 and 2003 editions). 
     
Table 2:  Standard Deviation 
 
VARIABLE SOE  MBS BS  BS+MBS DATA 
Output  1.50 1.89 1.83 2.28 2.79 
Consumption 2.45 2.68 2.56 2.67 3.60 
Investment  3.87 6.41 6.79  10.90 10.75 
Bank Markup (Net 
Interest Margin) 
----- 11.69 ------ 23.03 23.09 
 
Notes: Observed and Theoretical second moments (as percent deviation from steady state values) are reported.   
-Theoretical Moments: SOE is the baseline small open economy model with nominal rigidities. BS adds the standard 
balance-sheet-effect to the previous specification; instead, MBS adds the Monopolistic Banking System setup. Finally, 
BS+MBS adds the “broad” financial accelerator (i.e. the combined effect of both).  The method used was the frequency 
domain technique depicted in Uhlig (1999).  
-Empirical Moments: Observed Statistics for the selected sample of eight developing economies are based in seasonally 
adjusted quarterly data. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), in the computations, I consider periods in which there is 
either a de facto peg or at least a de facto crawling band that never exceeds +/- 5 % range. Variables, except interest rates 
are transformed in logarithms. 
-For comparison purposes, both Empirical and Theoretical series are H-P filtered with a smoothness parameter of 1600 so 
that only the cyclical component remains.  
 
Table 3:  Welfare Analysis 
 
 BALANCE  SHEETS 
ONLY 








Notes: The welfare criteria considered here is based on a second-order Taylor expansion of the representative household's 
expected utility function (provided the parameterization specified in the paper). I report the percent increase in steady-state 





   ii
Figure 2 - Flexible Exchange rate AND Perfect Competition in the banking system 
 
Percent point response of the standard “balance-sheet” (Solid Line), and the standard small open economy (SOE) with nominal 
rigidities (Dashed Line) models’ to an unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate.  
 
Figure 3 - Flexible Exchange rate AND MONOPOLISTIC BANKING SYSTEM 
 
Percent point response of the complete (solid line), and the standard “balance-sheet” (dashed line) models’ to an unanticipated 
one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate.    iii
Figure 4 —Local Currency Pricing and Incomplete pass-tHrough  
 
Percent point response of the complete (solid line), and the standard “balance-sheet” (dashed line) models’ to an unanticipated 
one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate. I assume that price adjustment in the foreign goods’ sector follows 
the specification described in Appendix B.  
 
Figure 5- FIXED Exchange rate AND MONOPOLISTIC BANKING SYSTEM 
 
Percent point response of the complete (solid line), and the standard “balance-sheet” (dashed line) models’ to an unanticipated 
one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate. I assume the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime.   iv




Percent point response of the standard “balance-sheet” (solid line), and the standard SOE with nominal rigidities (Dashed 
Line) models’ to an unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate. I assume the presence of a fixed 
exchange rate regime and perfect competition in the banking system. 
 
Figure 7- the “BANK-Supply channel.” 
 
 
Percent point response of the monopolistic banking system (solid line), and the standard SOE with nominal rigidities (Dashed 
Line) models’ to an unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate. I assume the presence of a fixed 
exchange rate regime and no balance-sheet effects.  
 
Figure 8- the “BROAD” FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR. 
 
 
Percent point response of the complete (solid line), and the standard SOE with nominal rigidities (Dashed Line) models’ to an 
unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the foreign interest rate. I assume the presence of a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  